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ABSTRACT 
 
 
CHINA AT THE G20 SUMMIT: A CASE STUDY 
 
 
By 
 
 
LI, JIANWEI 
 
 
Globalization offers the countries in the world more opportunities to make better use of the 
integrated market, while at the same time, adds the difficulties of global governance to 
dealing with “the tragedy of commons.”Global Financial Crisis is one example of calling 
for collective action for solution. China is pushed to the front stage, because of its fast and 
enduring economic growth in recent 20 years and its current position to influence the world 
economic and political order. The international community is interested in China’s real 
thinking and position, “is China seeking its national interest or supporting the global 
governance?” By comparing China’s perspective of global governance (Harmonious world 
theory) to the western theory (public goods and Dani Rodrik’s Tri-lemma), we find that it’s 
not in the same context and system. By studying the 3 cases of China in the G20 summit: 
1China’s entry into the G20; 2.China’s endeavor for RMB Exchange Rate Dispute; 
3China’s efforts to reshape the Global Reserve System, the author reaches the conclusion 
that China is seeking its national interest within the framework of the “Harmonious World 
Theory”, while trying to minimize the cost of violating the existing rules of game. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
               The 2008 Global Financial Crisis is a significant event to the world, which 
reminds the countries to review what an integrated world means today, and also sets the old 
issues urgently on the table and calls for solutions and adjusted policies promptly. This kind 
of statement seems to ignore the pains and suffers of the crisis to the world, but actually it 
does not. The international community is motivated to review the existing system and to 
strive for coordination and cooperation to extensive degree as much as the solutions are 
possible. The G20 is upgraded to the leader’s level and pushed to the front of the stage. As 
a newly formed international organization in terms of its new participants, facing the 
mixture and complexity of new and old issues in financial system and also global 
governance, the G20 summits have received higher expectations and more doubts than ever 
before. 
               While in this regime, China attends all past summits and gets a chance to express 
its opinion and to work with its colleagues from advanced and developing countries. The 
world has witnessed China’s role at the meeting, and all kinds of comments and judgments 
regarding China’s role in the past and future are filled with the media and academic field. 
They are focusing on China’s “wallet” and “voice”: wallet indicates its generous and 
willingness to contribute to the economic recovery; voice stands for what stance and 
forward role it may hold. They also intend to see the future prospect of the G20 by properly 
recognizing China’s role. 
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               The purpose of this paper is to examine and investigate in-depth China’s 
perspective of global governance, how China behaves in past G20 summits, in order to 
identify China’s role positioning, which is helpful, in turn, to identify and predict the future 
of global governance in world economy. 
 
               We have been long and extensively facing an economic dilemma of “tragedy of 
commons” or “collective action dilemma.” Each party holds different views and 
expectations to other members and also to the G20 regime as a whole, they may also 
question that whether China in the G20 seeks “national interest” or “global governance”. 
This two seems exclusive to each other, because national interest indicates selfish of 
sovereign state, while global governance requires collective action and emphasizes 
common benefits than individual interests. By conducting research and study, the author 
argues that China is seeking its national interest, while at the same time; conditionally 
shoulder some certain responsibilities, at the lowest cost of violating the existing rules of 
game. 
 
               To support the idea, the author will introduce China’s perspective of global 
governance by comparing China’s “Harmonious world theory”, which indicates that 
China’s view to the global governance is starting from identification of state sovereignty, 
emphasizing global governance without hegemony, and resorting solution to institution and 
consensus building. Then the author will try to explain why China joins the G20: China 
prefers the G20 to the G7/8, and China intends to be inclusive than to be excluded. The 
paper is followed by observations of China’s view to several issues in G20 agenda, the 
  
3 
 
debate of China’s exchange rate regime and rebalances the current account, reform of the 
global reserve system. Based on review and analysis of China’s position and behavior, the 
author concludes by further thinking of global governance of the political economy. 
 
2. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE G20’S ROLE POSITIONING 
 
 
               In 1998 Asian Financial Crisis,whentheG20financial ministers gather for the first 
time to discuss the solution to the financial crisis; that’s the start of the regime of what we 
have today—those 20 members. As a newly established regime (compared to the UN, 
WTO, IMF), the world has new expectations and curiosity of what it is and what function 
and role it is going to play. Meanwhile, it’s not new in the sense that it’s the upgraded 
version of G7/8 and its function is dealing with the world common issues as other 
international organizations do. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis makes this form more 
upgraded, when the 20 countries’ leaders are convened in Washington D.C. to find 
solutions and responses to the financial crisis. 
 
(a) Western Theory Of Global Governance 
 
               Actually, there is no specific global governance theory marked as “western” style; 
to distinguish with the Chinese perspective of global governance, we call the traditional 
school of global governance as western theory. Western theory of global governance 
develops from the economic theory and game theory about “public good” and “collective 
action dilemma”. In economics, a public good is a good that is both non-excludable and 
non-rival in that individuals cannot be effectively excluded from use and where use by one 
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individual does not reduce availability to others (Wikipedia 2012). For example, the light 
house is a public good: ships can use it for direction, and one ship’s using is not excluding 
others, neither is reducing the total amount available for others. The problem of public good 
is free-ride, everyone in the organization wants to use the lighthouse for free, but no one 
pays for the construction and maintenance fee, which also called “tragedy of commons”. 
We can also explain this as “collective action dilemma”, the lighthouse need joint 
contributions and actions while all parties are expecting others to pay more, and they 
themselves can Free-ride more. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1Dani Rodrik’s trilemma 
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               With regard to the political economy, Dani Rodrik’s (2011) tri-lemma model 
provides us the framework to understand the issue comprehensively. In political perspective 
of world economy, as Figure 1 shows, we cannot simultaneously have hyper-globalization, 
democratic politics, and national state; we can only pick any two but have to give up one. 
Based on the tri-lemma, we can think of three scenarios that world economies have 
experienced, and find the implications. 
 
Scenario No.1: Hyper-globalization and nation state but restricted policymaking. To realize 
the full potential of the global market, certain rule of game should be imposed to reduce the 
transaction cost and strengthen the market confidence, such as open borders, protection of 
equal access to the world market for every single country, deregulation and openness to all 
rounds. It indicates that the general paradigm is popular and suggested around the world, 
single country don’t have multiple choices from its own preference. This scenario also 
referred to as “golden straight jacket”. 
 
Scenario No.2: Hyper-globalization and democratic politics but no nation states. If we 
upgrade and extend the democracy to the international level, the concept of national states 
will dilute. For example, The United States itself is the model of such global federalism, 
when we look each state rather than the country as its unit of component, it seems no 
problem for the federal government to coordinate each parts. For comparison, the European 
Union is the example of the other side, which means sovereign states still strong in its 
members’ mind, so the degree of global federalism is weakened compared to the US. One 
thing to point out is that they both have globalization and democratic politics. 
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Scenario No.3: Shallow globalization and Bretton Woods compromises. This scenario is 
more approaching to the reality of today’s world—totally diversity of nation states and 
democratic politics, as compromise of deep globalization we observed. We have divergent 
way of development, not so much we can complain, but the transaction cost of deep 
globalization is the opportunity cost of the world we are giving up. 
 
(b) Global Leadership And The G20’s Role 
 
               The major task of global governance is to provide public goods that can benefit 
for the world and get rid of free-ride problems of responsibility and resources. “There is 
such a thing as the global public good…for that very reason; we need to think about the 
issues of global governance needed to manage them.” UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
said, “Two areas in which he felt better global governance is especially urgent is getting the 
global economy to work for the entire world's people…” (UzReport.com2010) 
The resulting mosaic of international agreements, official institutions, informal groupings 
and informal discussions among influential people is the best our world of some 200 
countries can now do. Is it good enough? No. Will it get better soon? Probably not. Is it 
better than nothing? Yes, it certainly is. (FT.com2007) 
 
               Above-mentioned are some views on the G20’s role and expectations, both 
positive and negative. The G20, rather than one single country into day’s international 
system, is expected to exercise the global leadership. Leadership should have those 
qualities: to set the agenda, to mobilize the stakeholders, to exercise force for 
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implementation and to take the responsibility. It is different from a skillful mediator in 
multi-party negotiation. Mediator is, to some extent, just and neutral among the 
stakeholders and its force and power are based on the trust among the members; while 
leadership has, among its members, its self-interest and the force generating from the 
consensus. Leadership is more than mediator in terms of power for implementation rather 
than skill to mobilize. This power comes from rule-based institution legitimacy or balance-
of-power-based consensus building. The current international institutions, e.g. the UN, the 
IMF, are generally regarded as “adequate legitimacy but effectiveness deficiency.” The 
G20 is an adhoc regime to complement the slow decision-making of the formal institutions, 
and generate effective global leadership to deal with the emergencies. Mr. Bradford and 
Lim provide us a whole picture to understand the G20 as global leadership in the following 
dimensions. (BradfordandLim2011) 
 Strategic leadership: 
 Leaders of G20 member countries are expected to exercise the leadership through the 
certain high strategic level, to provide a sense of direction toward the solution of 
current issue during the particular hard situation. Whatever coordination action needed 
to save the world economy should be considered and recommended, and the nature of 
the G20 regime has its flexibility and potential to offer such framework and guidance. 
 Political Leadership:  
               In the national level, the financial market failure deteriorates the public trust to the 
market and also the government regulations, in terms of oversight, supervision, monitoring 
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and regulation of the financial institution and market. The G20 has the obligation to provide 
the general direction to the cross-national level; at the same time, it is also requiring 
restoring the public trust and reconfirming the political leadership.  
 Integrative Leadership: 
In 21
st century, the economic issues are never separated from political issues; 
they mixed over and are not always clearly emerged on the surface of the water. Under this 
situation, global governance is a concept of integrative outlook, so we have to consider the 
solution in comprehensive ways of thinking rather than anchoring the financial model when 
dealing with the 2008 Financial Crisis. In other word, the prescription should be strong and 
comprehensive enough to deal with the serious disease not accumulated and evolved in a 
single day. 
 Institutional Reform Leadership:  
               Under the crisis we are confused by the defects of existing international 
organizations, such as “democratic deficits”. The G20, as an adhoc regime, besides 
effective solution to the global issue, should also guide the reforms of those institutions for 
better function in resistance of new crisis in the future.   
 Pragmatic Leadership:  
Particular complexity and interconnected situation call for removing some unnecessary 
obstacles toward the possible final solution, which are different from the previous century 
when we are entangled much more with ideology differences. Now we are also in the 
transition to build a consensus or a culture intrinsically that all measures and regulations are 
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evidence-based and problem-solving-oriented, not much ingredient with balance or 
compromise of ideology conflict.  
 Inclusive Leadership: 
 It is understandable that the representative and legitimacy issues are always in existence in 
the G20 leaders’ mind. G20 is to address the issue of the world, which composed of other 
172 nations that are not show-up in the summits. However, their interests should be well 
considered as one basic principle, in order to make the decision-making process more 
effective.  
 
3. China’s Perspective: "Harmonious World Theory” 
 
               China’s perspective of global governance can be reflected by its proposal to the 
world order—“Harmonious World Theory”. In this part, the author introduces the main 
idea of China’s “Harmonious World Theory”, and gets the hints of China’s view and 
analyzes its differences with the mainstream theory of global governance, in order to dig 
the answer to the original research question, “Is China seeking the national interest or 
global governance?” 
 
(a) China And International Organizations: Historical Review 
 
China’s participation into the international organizations is not a long history since the 
foundation of People’s Republic of China, and can be divided into three stages. The first 
one is 1949-1971, the second stage is 1971-1978, the third stage is from1979-present, these 
three stages is accompanied by China’s foreign policy adjustment, economic system change 
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and the judgment of its national interests change. 
 
The First Stage: In 1949, China established its new government—People’s Republic of 
China, and spent much more efforts to consolidate its political regime and governance. 
During that period, China was focusing on its internal affairs, and the main target of its 
foreign policy was to get support from the communist camp and to get acknowledgment 
and recognition by the outside world. The limited numbers of international organization 
that China concerned with was the United Nation; So China tried almost every effort to 
fight for its due and legitimate seat at the UN that was taken by Taiwan authority. Until 
1971, China succeeded and the United Nation accepted and recognized that P.R. China was 
the only representative government. Except the UN, there was seldom contact between 
China and other international organizations 
 
The Second Stage: In 1971, China maintained the regular relationship with the UN, which 
was a good start for China’s involvement to international organizations. However, China 
had not much incentive to enhance the relationship with other international organizations. 
During that period, China’s internal political policies were focused much on the ideology, 
e.g. socialist regime or capitalist regime, and protecting from the outside revolutionary 
fever; meanwhile, its economic system was closed, and based on central planning rather 
than market. Incentives to build more relations with international organizations, e.g. the 
financial and economic cooperation institutions, were limited. 
 
 The Third Stage: In 1978, China’s leaders moved the focus of domestic policy from 
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the political ideology protection (“socialist” or “capitalist”) to the economic development, 
and followed by a series of reforms, which was named the Economic System Reform and 
Opening-up Policy (“gaigekaifang”). Then China tried to attach more importance to market 
regimes and to be more open than before. After that, China appeared in the international 
stage more than ever before, and this change also provided the opportunities for the world 
to know more and better about China. (Refers to Figure 2) 
 
Figure 2:  China's International Organization Membership 
 
 
 
(b) China’s “Harmonious World Theory” 
 
               China’s leaders remarks are the windows to collect the information of Chinese 
government’s policy and prospective. At the summits of 60th anniversary of the 
establishment of the United Nations, Chinese president, Hu Jintao, delivered a speech 
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entitled “Making Great Efforts to Build a Harmonious World with Long-lasting Peace and 
Common Prosperity”, which marked an important outlook of China’s perspective and 
understanding of the global governance. In his speech, he pointed out that the new century 
was featured of integration and globalization in depth and coexistence of opportunities and 
challenges, and he called for all the countries work to get her to build “a harmonious world 
with long-lasting peace and common prosperity.” To realize the goal, he emphasized the 
commitment to adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and basic principle 
of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and collaboration; he advocated to promote 
development of the developing countries by establishing more justified international trade 
system and enhancing economic and energy dialogue; here iterated that right for each 
country to independently choose its social system and development road, and necessity to 
maintain the diversification of civilizations in the spirit of equality and openness.(Chinese 
foreign ministry 2005) This theory was reiterated and cited in many occasions to work as a 
norm and orientation on China’s foreign policy. 
 
               There are four implications of the “Harmonious World Theory” as China’s 
perspective of the global governance. First, governance under democracy and participation: 
reducing conflicts. Harmonious world requires extensive participation to eliminate conflicts 
between advanced countries and developing countries. Currently, the international 
institutions are regarded as “democracy deficit”, because they are dominant by limited 
numbers of countries, e.g. the advanced countries designated the head of those institutions 
and they can dominant the agenda and lead the order, while developing countries have little 
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voice and influence. To reduce the dispute—the meaning of harmonious—those 
international organizations should be fully participated and effectively influenced by 
developing countries, which indicates that they are servicing more extensive common 
interests rather than the interests of certain powerful nations. 
 
               Second, common prosperity and development: reducing the disparity between 
north and south. The global governance should improve its institution and international 
systems to promote developed countries to stimulate the aggregate demand, to increase the 
market volume, and to transfer technology, at the same time, to help developing countries 
enhance south-south cooperation, make use of the market and explore its development 
potential. It will helpful to narrow the disparity between the north and south, and make sure 
every country can get benefit, more or less, from globalization and integration. 
 
               Third, respecting diversity and promoting tolerance: reconciliation amidst 
differences. Chinese philosophers interpret harmony as reconciliation amidst differences 
(“heerbutong”). China doesn’t want to work as a preacher to impose ideology to others, but 
to find common interest under the coexistence of different background and identifications. 
Harmonious world needs different civilizations to communicate and cooperate, which 
requires adequate tolerance between each other. Global governance should balance well the 
increasing interdependence and reluctance to dilute self-identification. 
 
               Fourth, peaceful resolution: pragmatic and creative way of thinking Conflict and 
confrontation do not mean harmony; neither does using arm force or threat to use. Each 
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participant contributes actively by pragmatic and creative way of thinking to dispute 
resolution, every country holds goodwill not to hurt the interest of other country, that’s the 
harmony advocates (Wang and Rosenau 2009). 
 
(c)  Debriefing China’s Perspective of “National Interests” And “Global Governance” 
Combining China’s “Harmonious World Theory” and western’s global governance outlook 
as a whole, we can extract and identify China’s national interest and its perspective of 
global governance. 
 
China’s National Interest: 
1.   Maintaining the sovereign state and diversity of the world. 
               Before the collapse of Soviet Union, China belonged to the socialist bloc with the 
Soviet Union’s leadership, which opposed the western ideology characterized by capitalism 
and imperialism. When Soviet Union collapsed in1990s, China was at a cross road and 
facing the choices of development model it was going to follow. At that time, Chinese 
leaders reconfirmed socialist development model with Chinese characteristics and the 
guiding principles of the foreign policy, which have four main points. First, not to uphold 
the banner of Soviet Union: China would not seek the role of leadership as USSR had ever 
played while China still kept the socialist system. Second, not playing the leadership of “the 
third world” or developing countries: China would not seek to play leadership role even 
though it defined itself as one of the biggest developing countries. Thirdly, not seeking 
confrontation with western world; but to get a tranquil international environment, China 
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would seek the common interests while holding diversity with western system. Fourthly, to 
avoid making enemies with the former USSR countries: China would reserve its comments 
to former Soviet Union countries in ideology, rather than arousing hostility to them. These 
four principles are still working today as the dominant guide line for China’s diplomacy. 
2.   Getting More Benefits from World Market with Equal and Just Distribution. 
 
               China’s experience of economic development teaches itself that opening-up and 
making good use of the world market can increase the wealth of the nation. China’s rising 
evidently demonstrates this principle, but China still claims equal opportunities and more 
justified world economic order, because the current international system is designed by and 
served for the developed countries’ interests. China wants more equally distribution, to 
improve the situation that each member country in the system can get benefits. China has a 
traditional philosophy: Inequality is worse than deficiency (“Buhuanguaerhuanbujun”), 
which means inequality will distort the incentive to generating more common good. 
 
3.   The political stability, economic security and sustainable development. China is       
Communist-party-lead country, which, from the eyesight of the outside world, is similar as 
the1960s’Japan and1970s’South Korea in terms of economic development, political 
environment and people’s way of thinking. It is defined as “Developmental State” rather 
than “Development Democracies”; This “Developmental State” can generate enough 
growth and employment to keep the people relatively satisfied, and its legitimacy could 
depend on the fruits of economic performance by calling for unity and stability rather than 
democracy and human rights. (AHN2004) In order to ensure the political stability, China 
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has to protect its access to the resources and market, because its economy relies much more 
on the export and import, which infers as “economic security “to ensure its development. 
China’s view on global governance revises the intuition of the simple model-taking one 
from the two options; based on the complexity of the tri-lemma, it is hard to tell where the 
real global governance is located. There is no golden rule of game that is perfectly defined 
as the public good that each country should sacrifice all its self-interest. 
 
               In order to avoid the bad impression that is divergent from China’s claim of “a 
responsible big power,” the best approach is to minimize its possibility to violate the 
existing rules of game. Meanwhile, the proper way to adjust the rules of game will be 
respecting diversity with downgraded globalization rather than rules of game to maximize 
the benefits of coordination.  (Rodrik2011) In order to keep diversity, China have to give 
up maximize the benefits of global governance, but to minimize the cost of violating the 
existing rules of game. 
4. CASE STUDY: National Interest vs. Global Governance 
 
4.1China’s entry into the G20 
               To evaluate and predict China’s role, it is better to acknowledge the background 
and review the facts; the relation of China and other international institutions, especially, 
China with G7/8, is important. In this part, the author is collecting the history evidence of 
China’s relation with those international institutions and China’s historical performance and 
attitude to the G7/8. Based on those facts, we find that though it is hard to predict the 
benefits and costs, the potential benefits and better situation and attract China’s entry into 
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the G20. 
 
Evolution and co-existence of G7/8and G20 
G7/8, as a “rich man’s club” and “concerted club” and specially dealing with the 
international economical and financial issues, had a history after the World War II. It was 
successful to exercise the leadership to guide the financial system and also to involve some 
hot issues tentatively, based on its shared value system and ideology. “The summit’s 
perfect attendance record, achieved despite demands on leader’s time back home, show 
how important the summit has been to leaders in managing domestic politics as well as 
international affairs.”(Kirton2011)  
               However, coming to the new century, this club encountered some problems to 
well function. It was caused by circumstances’ change, named “an intensely globalizing 
world characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and shock-activated non-state 
vulnerabilities that it brought.” (Kirton2011) G7/8 started to consider expanding its group 
and including the other stakeholders from emerging market countries. In the new century 
the newcomers were welcomed to the old club, followed by the new structure of G7/8+G5. 
2008 Global Financial Crisis enhances the G7/8+G5 to the G20 as the bindings and fixture 
of G20 we are discussing in this paper; however, the elite group, or the internal group of 
G7/8 is not replaced or evaporated, they are still running the old fashion in parallel with 
G20 and has its own concerned topic and function. 
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China and G7/8 
 
               China’s  participation   as  one  form  of  G5  or  the  G20  never  changed  its self-
identification, also the identification of the core group--G7/8. In author’s personal view, it’s 
similar to the concept of “diversity” and “pluralism” in dealing with religious and ethnic 
group issues. Pluralism implies diversity; but from diversity to real engagement into the 
system requires along procession one hand, G7/8needs participation of outside groups; on 
the other side, they cannot fully get rid of prejudice and intolerance. Anyway, the truth is 
that China participated in all the summits in the 21stcentury. From the realist perspective, 
the author observes China is active in participation, even if it doubts the real engagement 
and acceptance,   based on the following considerations, especially measure-up of its 
national interest. 
 
               First, China is clear in mind that joining “the rich man’s club” does not mean it is 
in the group of advanced countries and as rich as other members. China understands that 
the complexity of the world economic situation adds more difficulty for those rich men to 
manage the world properly; at the same time, China’s rising economic share in the world 
economy upgraded its status as a stakeholder for collective actions, especially in the 
financial crisis period, China’s economic potential may offer more possibilities to the 
solution. 
 
               Second, comparing the benefits and costs to join the club, China is anxious to lose 
the support from developing counties. The worst situation China has to avoid is that both 
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rich men and its partners from the third world, group of developing countries, isolate it. 
Meanwhile, China cherishes and supports more legitimacy of the UN and other formal 
international institutions, because they can guarantee, in some sense, the shares and status it 
has already granted in those organizations. However, chances are there that the G20 is 
better than the G7/8 for China to express itself and enhance its confidence; participation to 
set the rule is painful, because China has to compromise some of its national interest for the 
common good, but taking other side of view, rule setter has less possibility  to violate the 
rules of the game because the final rule is reflecting part of its concern and interest, that is, 
to reduce the potential conflict and probability to violate the rule makes sense for China’s 
national interest. 
 
                Third, China activeness can also be understood that they have basic need to 
enhance communication with the inner group—G7/8, even though they don’t have 
confidence that how much progress they will make. Chinese leaders always believe they 
have to diminish estrangement and deal with the complaint through proper peaceful 
approaches, especially dialogue; meanwhile, they know misunderstanding comes from 
unfamiliar, so they have intention to let the outside world know much about China. They 
are confident that the G20 is such kind of platform, especially when it upgraded as “the 
premier forum for international economic cooperation” and “a steering committee.” 
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4.2 China’s RMB Exchange Rate Dispute 
               China started its opening up and caught the world’s attention from1990s, when its 
export-led economy kept nearly two digits percentage growth rate per year. After China’s 
entry into the WTO in 2001, it cancelled many subsidies and protectionist measures for its 
industry, in order to meet the requirements of WTO rules. At the same time, China still held 
the fixed foreign exchange rate regime, which meant that China’s Central bank imposed its 
influence to manage its currency value and monetary policy stability. To the developed 
countries, this growth pattern led to the accumulation of trade surplus, which created the 
global imbalance and was harmful to its trade partners. 
 
               China revalued the RMB (Chinese currency) by 2.1% in 2005. At the same time, 
Chinese authorities abandoned the dollar peg system that the nation had previously adopted, 
and took “reform to improve the exchange rate formation mechanism of the Yuan” (“Yuan 
reform”). The reason for this change was, articulated by a spokes person of the People’s 
Bank of China (China’s central bank), "Promotion of reform of the Yuan’s foreign 
exchange rate formation mechanism is based on the need to alleviate foreign trade 
imbalance, expand domestic demand, improve companies' international competitiveness, 
and raise the country's level of openness to the world.” Under the new “managed float” 
policy, China agreed to let the RMB trade in a defined daily trading band while allowing it 
to gradually appreciate. This move pacified China’s trading partners while still allowing it 
to maintain complete control over its currency (Cao, etal.2011). 
               During the Global Financial Crisis, the US had some hard needed from China for 
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the recovery, so the attitude to China’s exchange rate issues often to some extent. However, 
with the dynamic of domestic policy pressure, especially manufacturing industry and the 
unemployment, the US government recalled its position to press appreciation of RMB and 
reform of the flexible FX regime. 
 
               China’s exchange rate issue has been a hot topic in the past summits. Some 
commentators believed that China's currency policy is far from the most important problem 
facing the global economy, but it receives a disproportionate amount of political attention 
in the United States, and will continue to be at the center of the bilateral economic dialogue. 
(Oxford Analytica 2009, Asia Pulse 2010). At the Seoul summit, the US expressed its hope 
to force countries like China to keep their large trade surpluses below 4 percent of gross 
domestic product, possibly through appreciation of their currencies. China did not respond 
directly to the exchange rate issue but focused on the US Quantitative Easing policy. China 
and other Asian economies saw first-hand that rather than spurring more U.S. growth (on 
which Asian exporters still depend), U.S. monetary ease had flooded the developing world 
economies with dollars they're not able to absorb (Anonymous2010). 
 
Why didn’t China take the appreciation pressure? 
               Subsidy plus tax preference policy vs. exchange rate policy can bet woo measures 
to promote development of manufacturing sector domestically and can offset each other, 
even though the former is not efficient way according to economic theory. South Korea’s 
Heavy Chemical and Industrialization (HCI) policy promoted its industrialization through 
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the subsidy and preference tax-policy, which was opposed and banned by the WTO later, 
while the devaluation of its currency was proper measure to promote its export and 
compensate the distortion of HCI policy. In 1980s, China conducted the similar industrial 
policy-trade restrictions, investment incentives, subsidies, and domestic processing 
requirements-that did not spill over into a trade imbalance. In 1990s, China brought tariffs 
down sharply and phased out many of the subsidies and domestic-processing requirements 
to bring policies in line with WTO requirements. (Rodrik2011)  In order to offset the 
negative effect of the above-mentioned policy change, China insisted to maintain the 
currency value and fight for the appreciation pressure. 
 
               The more deeply China involves into this growth model, the less it dares to adjust 
its exchange rate policy easily, though it is hard to tell the real effect of China’s currency 
appreciation. The generally agreed model that depreciation will better off the current 
account, then the real economy, is not fully convincing, because the model is simpler than 
the reality. However, China’s leader is precautious to manage the policy, because any 
negligence will have high risk and may cause too much in such a big country and with such 
big population. Japan’s economic suffering after “The Plaza Accord” teaches China a lot. 
China will try its best to turn away from Japan’s old ways. Though Japan’s economic 
situation may different from China’s, China is still reluctant to compromise to the historical 
evidence and leaves its economy in risk and danger. 
 
               Now we can understand China’s concern to revalue its currency potential threat to 
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China’s national interest. Dani Rodrik (2011) suggests that China's growth might be 
reduced by 2 percentage points or more if the RMB (Chinese currency) is allowed to 
appreciate sufficiently to eliminate its undervaluation. Chinese premier Wen Jiabao 
expressed his view on many occasions, “if we follow some country’s pressure, letting RMB 
appreciated 20%~40%, then many of China’s enterprises will go bankrupt, many of farmer 
workers will lose their jobs and be forced to return to the country-side, China’s economic 
growth will be pulled down and the society will have huge unstable problems.” 
 
4.3 China’s Efforts to Reshape the Global Reserve System 
Problems of Global Reserve System 
 
               Globally, there serve system is causing deflation bias, and is unfair and unstable. 
Firstly, this system doesn’t promote development and growth in reality. For example, the 
developed counties, say the US, lends some money to help the developing counties, while 
at the same time, in order to maintain the stability of foreign countries’ currency value, 
foreign countries have to purchase certain amount of US bond, the interest rate of US bond 
cannot offset the interest they have to pay from the aid, finally, there is no positive income 
to the developing countries. In addition, this amount of money putting into financial market 
doesn’t create jobs. Secondly, it is unfair because the capitals are not flowing from rich 
countries to poor countries, which indicates that poor country have to provide financial aid 
to the rich country. On this issue, many economists confused because according to their 
theory, the capital should flow from the capital abundant country to capital scarce country, 
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and they are trying to explain this as the poor country has different production level, or low 
productivity, and poor technology and institution, which indicates that they are not ready 
for accommodate the in-flowed capital. Actually, the poor country have to give up more 
profits that they may invest in other projects but to hold the US bonds for security, in other 
sense, it explains the irrational flow of capital from downside to upside. Third, the current 
system is unstable, even for the US. Every country hold foreign reserves for its currency 
stability, but globally looking, it has no contribution to the global aggregate demand. The 
money put into the reserves could not stimulate the development to real economy, which 
otherwise is helpful for growth and unemployment.  The more country involve in this 
system, less intendancy of them to promote consumption and investment. 
 
               Why are developing countries, such as China, willing to hold their foreign 
reserves denominated in dollar? First, the more dependent the country relied on the foreign 
trade; it is more intend to get rid of the exchange rate fluctuation to guarantee its export 
profits. Then holding certain amount of foreign reserves is served as a buffer; theoretically 
it may be well functioned, the central bank can make adjustment in foreign country’s 
interest rate increasing or in domestic recession. Second, foreign countries don’t have many 
choices but to purchase the US government bond as its foreign reserves because of the 
lower risk, which means the former are willing to give up some risk premium of holding 
assets denominated in other currencies. 
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China’s response: RMB internationalization and proposing SDRs 
 
               Under this assumption, countries try to reduce their dependency on US dollar as 
global reserve currency, either by promoting their own currency in international market or 
by diversifying the assets they hold. China, with its economic expansion and increasing 
economic power, is trying to diversify its asset denominated in US dollar to reduce the 
dependency and risk; meanwhile, it is planning to enhance the status of its currency to be 
more international. China has already initiated some steps to internationalize the RMB by 
enhancing its function as medium of transactions. China launched that pilot RMB Trade 
Settlement Scheme in 2009 and thus made an important step toward the goal of 
internationalizing its currency. In terms of currency cooperation between the central banks, 
China has signed currency swap agreements with its trading partners, including South 
Korea, Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, Belarus, Indonesia, Argentina, Iceland, and Singapore, 
and by the end of2011thetotalvolume reached 1.3trillion yuan (about $210 billion). 
(Ren2010) Moreover, China is working on promoting Shanghai’s status as an international 
finance center. However, there is far way ahead for Chinese RMB becoming international 
currency. 
 
China is also active to promote Special Drawing Right (SDR) in the G20 regime. 
 
               The International Monetary Fund (IMF) created the SDR in 1969 to support the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. The IMF’s objective was to introduce into 
the payments mechanism a new type of international money, in addition to the dollar and 
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gold, which could be transferred among participating nations in settlement of payments 
deficits. It was felt that neither dollars nor gold, by themselves, could provide ample 
liquidity for the world. With the IMF managing the stock of SDRs, world reserves 
presumably would grow in line with global commerce (IMF, 2009). 
 
               The SDRs are apparently beneficial for China and other developing countries. 
Diversification of the global reserve currency will release China’s dependence on US 
economy and gain more economic security. The stability of global reserve system will 
reduce China’s need to run huge foreign reserves to stabilize the currency value, which 
means this saved capital can be invested to chase more benefits in financial market and 
stimulate more output in real economy. 
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCULUSION 
               In this paper, we start from a popular economic dilemma that whether China 
chooses “national interest” or “global governance” in the G20.We put this question in 
context of China’s “Harmonious World theory” and western classic theory of global 
governance, we find that it’s not a simple choice a stake on other; we find the reality is 
located in some were among the tri-lemma, and the trend to move somewhere else we 
cannot easily predict. However, we observe China’s perspectives of national interests and 
global governance, and claimed that China will take national interests while taking care of 
certain global governance obligations at the lowest cost of violating the rule. Through the 
case studies, we learn that China’s past behavior in the G20 reflects its incentives to chase 
and fight for its national interests, under the existing rules of the game. 
               Before the conclusion, one point to add and clarify is that everything is not 
absolute and has the other side of coin. China’s seeking national interest is not equal to the 
concept that China wants to free ride and to gain at the cost of others, if were call the 
economic story of “tragedy of commons.” Rather, China’s strategy is also win-win in some 
sense. For example, China’s well address of domestic problems is the contribution to the 
world; China’s efforts to stabilize its economic growth thus increasing world aggregate 
demand a real so beneficial to the world. 
               We conclude that China in the past G20 summits fights for its national interest to 
maintain its advocating of diversity of world, sovereignty right, just distribution of world 
welfare, political stability and economic security. This implies that trend or direction of 
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global governance in world economy. We may not demand the maximum of benefits of 
deep globalization, but minimize the harm that unilateral action may bring by respecting the 
diversity of the world. Every theory and model has the limit, we may predict the 
equilibrium point according to the models, but the truth is that the current situation may 
have already combined and reflected all theoretical models—the reality itself is the 
equilibrium of all models. 
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